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I. Introduction
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(“NOAA”), “offshore aquaculture is one of the new frontiers for marine aqua-
culture production” that could help supply America’s growing demand for 
seafood.1  U.S. aquaculture production totals about $1 billion annually, of 
which approximately twenty percent is marine species.2  Aquaculture of ma-
rine species, primarily molluscan shellfish (oyster, clams, mussels) and sal-
mon, occurs around the country in near-shore coastal waters managed by 
* J.D., M.S.E.L., Vermont Law School; Director, National Sea Grant Law
Center, University of Mississippi.  This research was funded under award number 
NA06OAR4170078 from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. The statements, findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of NOAA or the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. 
1. NOAA, OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES:  ECONOMIC CONSIDERA-
TIONS, IMPLICATIONS & OPPORTUNITIES 4 (July 2008). 
2. NOAA Aquaculture Program, Aquaculture in the United States,
http://aquaculture.noaa.gov/us/welcome.html (last visited July 9, 2009). 
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the states.3 
In May 2006, California enacted stringent environmental standards for 
marine finfish aquaculture in state waters.  The California Sustainable 
Oceans Act authorizes the California Fish and Game Commission (“Commis-
sion”) to lease state water bottoms or the water column for marine finfish 
aquaculture.4  Leases may only be issued if the site is appropriate for marine 
finfish aquaculture; the lease will not unreasonably interfere with fishing or 
public trust values or unreasonably disrupt wildlife or harm the environ-
ment; the operation minimizes the use of fish meal, fish oil, drugs, chemi-
cals, and antibiotics; the operation follows best management practices ap-
proved by the Commission; the facilities are designed to prevent escape; 
and, all finfish are tagged or marked to assist with identification.5  
Finfish aquaculture is not prohibited in federal waters and permits can, 
in theory, be secured for commercial operations.  That process is currently 
incredibly daunting, however, as multiple federal agencies have authority to 
regulate various aspects of an aquaculture operation.  For example, under 
the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Corps of Engineers issues permits for ob-
structions to navigation and under the Clean Water Act, the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency regulates the discharge of pollutants into naviga-
ble waters.  
Five miles west of Mission Beach in San Diego, Hubbs-SeaWorld Re-
search Institute (“HSWRI”) is planning an offshore aquaculture operation for 
striped bass and other fish species.6  HSWRI ultimately hopes to install 24, 
25-meter cages in water approximately 300 feet deep.7  The proposed project
would phase production by stocking enough juveniles to yield a maximum
of 3,000 metric tons (3,307 short tons) annually by year five and beyond.8
HSWRI also plans to develop other aquaculture activities around the striped
3. Id. States exercise jurisdiction zero to three nautical miles (nm) offshore
pursuant to authority granted by the Submerged Lands Act.  43 U.S.C. § 1312.  For 
Texas and the Gulf Coast of Florida, state jurisdiction extends to three marine lea-
gues (9 nm).  Id. 
4. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 15400(a).
5. Id. § 15400(b).
6. Hubbs-Sea World Research Institute, Offshore Aquaculture Demonstration
Project, http://www.hswri.org/offshore/ about.html (last visited July 14, 2009).  See also, 
Mike Lee, Institute Proposing Fish Farm in Federal Waters, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Feb. 2, 
2009. 
7. Velo Mitrovich, New Striped Bass Farm Tests U.S. Offshore Aquaculture Process,
IntraFish, Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.hswri.org/files/pressrelease/2009-02-
19%20Intrafish.pdf. 
8. HUBBS-SEA WORLD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE DEMONSTRA-
TION PROJECT 2 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.signonsandiego .com/news/metro/ 
images/090127aquaculture.pdf. 
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bass farm, such as mussel and seaweed culture.9  
If fully developed, HSWRI’s aquaculture operation would undoubtedly 
enhance California’s economy through additional jobs and revenues and 
provide a sustainable source of seafood.  The project, however, could nega-
tively impact California’s environment.  For example, organic wastes (excess 
feed and fish excrement) discharged from the cages could locally degrade 
water quality and adversely impact seafloor sediments.10  While the negative 
impacts can often be mitigated through the implementation of best man-
agement practices, such as orienting cages perpendicular to the current to 
assist with dispersion and limiting population densities,11 they should be 
carefully considered during the planning and permitting process.  
While the complexity and shortcomings of the federal permitting re-
gime have been detailed in great length,12 what role states may play in the 
regulation of offshore aquaculture is rarely discussed.  Part II of this article 
discusses the states’ indirect authority over offshore projects in federal wa-
ters pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”).  Part III eva-
luates whether states could apply their laws extraterritorially to regulate 
projects in federal waters.  Finally, Part IV examines the preemptive effect of 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“Magnu-
son Act” or “MSA”) on the exercise of state authority. 
II. Indirect Regulatory Authority of States over Aquaculture
in Federal Waters
A. CZMA
Congress has encouraged states to plan for marine aquaculture 
through the CZMA.  The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to provide 
funding to coastal states that want to amend their coastal management pro-
grams to address particular problems, such as wetlands loss, coastal ha-
zards, or public access.13  When it amended the CZMA in 1996, Congress 
added the “adoption of procedures and policies to evaluate and facilitate 
the siting of public and private aquaculture facilities in the coastal zone” as 
a coastal zone enhancement objective eligible for grant funding.14 
9. MARINE RESEARCH SPECIALISTS, HUBBS-SEA WORLD RESEARCH INSTITUTE: OFF-
SHORE AQUACULTURE DEMONSTRATION FINAL REPORT 6 (Oct. 2008). 
10. Id. at 45-49.
11. Id. at 57.
12. Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine:
Ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3 (2007); Jeremy Firestone, et al., Regulating 
Offshore Wind Power and Aquaculture: Messages from Land and Sea, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 71 (2004). 
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1456b.
14. Id. § 1456b(a).
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Once a state has a coastal management plan approved by NOAA, all 
federal agency activities, which include the issuance of permits and leases, 
“within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water use or nat-
ural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is 
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies 
of approved State management programs.”15  The CZMA is an example of 
“cooperative federalism,” whereby Congress has induced states to partici-
pate in a coordinated federal program.16 
The CZMA, therefore, provides a mechanism for states to influence 
federal decisions with respect to aquaculture in federal waters.  Aquaculture 
operations in federal waters, especially those occurring close to the federal-
state border of three nautical miles (nm), have the potential to affect land or 
water uses or the natural resources of a state’s coastal zone.  For example, in 
addition to the water quality impacts mentioned previously, fish could es-
cape from the aquaculture cages and potentially affect wild populations that 
frequent state waters.  
Section 307 of the CZMA requires applications for federal permits “to 
conduct an activity, in or outside of the coastal zone, affecting any land or 
water use or natural resource of the coastal zone of that state [to] provide in 
the application to the licensing or permitting agency a certification that the 
proposed activity complies with the enforceable policies of the state’s ap-
proved program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner consis-
tent with the program.”17  After receipt of its copy of the applicant’s certifica-
tion, states have six months to review the consistency certification and 
notify the responsible agency as to whether it concurs with or objects to the 
applicant’s consistency certification.18  States may also issue a “conditional 
concurrence.”19  In its concurrence letter to the federal agency, the state 
must explain “why the conditions are necessary to ensure consistency with 
specific enforceable policies of the management program.”20  If the federal 
agency and the applicant are unwilling to modify the application and project 
proposal pursuant to the state’s conditions, the state’s conditional concur-
rence is treated as an objection.21 
States, therefore, effectively have a veto over federal permits.  If the 
state objects, the federal agency may not issue the permit.  Applicants may 
appeal a negative consistency determination to the Secretary of Commerce 
15. Id. § 1456(c)(1)(A).
16. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 184 and 203-204 (2005). 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(C)(3)(A).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 15 C.F.R. § 930.4(a)(1).
21. Id. § 930.4(b).
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who may override the state’s objection if he finds “that the activity is consis-
tent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the inter-
est of national security.”22  Because a state’s objection to a consistency certi-
fication could prevent the project from moving forward completely, federal 
regulations direct federal agencies and applicants “to develop conditions 
that, if agreed to [by the State] during the State agency’s consistency review 
period and included in a Federal agency’s final decision . . . would allow the 
State agency to concur with the federal action.”23 
The consistency requirements provide California with a significant op-
portunity to influence the design, placement, and, ultimately, approval of 
offshore aquaculture operation.  For example, because aquaculture cages 
could potentially pose a hazard to navigation, the operator must obtain a 
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) pursuant to § 10 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”).24  In its § 10 application, the aquaculture 
operator would have to include a consistency certification explaining how 
the operation complies with the California’s federally approved coastal 
management plan.  
For instance, § 30231 of the California Coastal Act states that “the bio-
logical productivity and the quality of coastal waters, streams, wetlands, 
estuaries, and lakes appropriate to maintain optimum populations of ma-
rine organisms and for the protection of human health shall be main-
tained . . . through, among other means, minimizing adverse effects of waste 
water discharges . . . .”25  Consistency certifications, therefore, have to ad-
dress the impact of projects on the biological productivity and the quality of 
the coastal waters and how any adverse effects would be minimized. 
The Federal Consistency Unit of the California Coastal Commission 
(“CCC”), which handles consistency reviews in California,26 could find that 
the offshore aquaculture project, as proposed, is not consistent with Cali-
fornia’s coastal management plan.27  At that point, the agency has three op-
tions:  (1) object to the consistency certification, and thereby prevent the is-
22. Id.
23. 15 C.F.R. § 930.4(a).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 403.  (“The creation of any obstruction . . . to the navigable ca-
pacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; . . . except on plans 
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Ar-
my.”). 
25. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30231.
26. California Coastal Commission, Federal Consistency Program, 
http://www.coastal.ca.gov/fedcd/fedcndx.html (last visited July 9, 2009). 
27. It should be noted that in October 2008 consultants hired by Hubbs-
Seaworld Research Institute to analyze the potential environmental impacts of its 
proposed aquaculture project concluded that the project should be considered con-
sistent with the relevant provisions of the California Coastal Act. Marine Resource 
Specialists, supra note 10, at 101-104. 
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suance of the § 10 permit; (2) issue a conditional concurrence; or (3) 
tiate with operator and the Corps during the consistency review period for 
the imposition of conditions to bring the aquaculture operation into 
pliance with California’s coastal plan.  The CCC, for example, might seek to 
incorporate environmental standards similar to those imposed on projects 
in state waters under the Sustainable Oceans Act.  Regardless of the option 
a state chooses, the federal consistency provisions of the CZMA enable 
states to influence permitting decisions for activities in federal waters when 
those activities affect a land or water use or natural resource of the state’s 
coastal zone. 
B. Other Indirect Authority
States may also indirectly exert influence over offshore aquaculture by 
regulating aspects of offshore aquaculture operations that take place within 
the state’s borders, such as transportation or landing of aquaculture prod-
ucts.  For example, in Alaska “a person may not transport, possess, export 
from the state, or release into the waters of the state, any live fish unless the 
person holds a fish transport permit issued by the [Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game].”28  The denial of a state permit to transport live fish to and 
from an aquaculture operation in federal waters could effectively shut down 
the project. 
In California, “all aquaculture products sold or transported . . . must 
have been legally reared or imported by” a registered aquaculturist.29  A reg-
istered aquaculture facility is permitted to sell and transport live aquacul-
ture products authorized by its registration to anyone who has a license to 
possess those plants or animals for commercial purposes.30  Section 15101 
of the California Fish and Game Code requires the owner of an aquaculture 
facility in California to register with the Department of Fish and Game 
(“DFG”) and provide the owner’s name, the species grown, and the location 
of each operation.  An aquaculture facility is defined in regulations as any 
facility “devoted to the propagation, cultivation, maintenance and harvesting 
of aquatic plants and animals in marine, brackish or fresh water.”31 
HSWRI is a registered aquaculture facility in California approved to 
grow striped bass, white seabass, yellowtail, California halibut, and a few 
other species in state waters; however, its proposed facility in federal waters 
would not be registered.  As a result, HSWRI would not be able to transport 
or sell the striped bass it grows in California.  To eliminate this roadblock to 
the project, the California Department of Fish and Game is considering re-
28. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 41.005.
29. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 238(a).
30. Id. at § 238(c).
31. Id. at § 235(a).
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quiring aquaculture facilities in federal waters to register with the DFG.32 
III. Extraterritorial Application of State Law
The registration requirement, unlike the CZMA consistency provision,
would result in the direct state regulation of an offshore aquaculture opera-
tion.  It raises the question whether states have the authority to apply their 
laws beyond three nm from shore.  
In some situations, states may apply their laws extraterritorially.  “In 
matters affecting its interests a state may exercise extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion where there is no conflict with federal or international law.”33  The rules 
regarding extraterritorial application of state law are based on well-settled 
principles of international law.  In general, a nation has jurisdiction to regu-
late the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals wherever 
they may be as long as the exercise of jurisdiction does not infringe on the 
rights of another nation or its citizens.34  Nations may also regulate conduct 
that takes place within its territory and conduct that takes place outside its 
territory “that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territo-
ry.”35 
A. Citizenship
In 1941 in Skiriotes v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the extra-
territorial application of a Florida law regulating the sponge fishery. Lambi-
ris Skiriotes, a Florida citizen, was convicted in state court for using prohi-
bited diving equipment while fishing for sponges two marine leagues (six 
miles) from shore in the Gulf of Mexico.  Florida law prohibited “the use of 
diving suits, helmets or other apparatus used by deep sea divers, for the 
purpose of taking commercial sponges from the Gulf of Mexico, or the 
Straits of Florida, or other waters within the territorial limits of that State.”36  
Skiriotes appealed his conviction arguing that Florida did not have jurisdic-
tion to enforce its laws on the high seas. 
At the time, Florida claimed jurisdiction out to nine nm (or three ma-
rine leagues) pursuant to Spanish grants.37  International law, however, only 
32. Email from Devin Bartley, State Aquaculture Coordinator, California De-
partment of Fish and Game, to Stephanie Showalter, Director, National Sea Grant 
Law Center (Aug. 4, 2008, 1:16:46 CDT) (on file with author). 
33. John Briscoe, The Effect of President Reagan’s 12-mile Territorial Sea Proclamation
on the Boundaries and Extraterritorial Powers of the Coastal States, 2 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 225 
(1982). 
34. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402
35. Id.
36. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 70 (1941).
37. Florida’s jurisdictional claims were later affirmed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976). 
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granted coastal nations sovereignty over a three nm territorial sea.  Any wa-
ters beyond that were the high seas.  To the international community, Skiri-
otes was fishing in the high seas and he argued that Florida could not ex-
tend its jurisdiction beyond the international boundaries of the United 
States. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. 
If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon 
the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not 
likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas 
with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate inter-
est and where there is no conflict with Acts of Congress.38 
The Court concluded that Florida had a legitimate interest in “the proper 
maintenance of the sponge fishery.”39  Although Congress had passed a law 
prohibiting U.S. citizens from taking, possessing, and selling commercial 
sponges in the Gulf of Mexico below a minimum size, the Court found no 
conflict because the state law dealt only with the divers’ apparatus, not the 
size of the sponges.  Because Skiriotes was a citizen of the state of Florida, 
Florida had jurisdiction to regulate his conduct on the high seas. 
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Alaska went a step further.  In Alaska v. 
Bundrant, the court relied on Skiriotes to justify the extraterritorial application 
of a state king crab regulation to a resident of Washington State fishing in 
the Bering Sea.40  In reaching this conclusion, the court suggested the Skiri-
otes definition of “citizen” encompassed “all Americans.”41  The exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over both residents and non-residents is proper, 
according to the court, as long as “such an exercise is based on the conser-
vation principles inherent in their migratory characteristics and not based 
on artificial boundaries or political circumstances.”42 
B. Effects
“The effects doctrine recognizes that a state may exercise extraterri-
torial jurisdiction over conduct outside the state that has or is intended to 
have a substantial effect within the state so long as the exercise of jurisdic-
tion does not conflict with federal law and is otherwise reasonable.”43  The 
Alaska Supreme Court recently applied the effects doctrine to find that 
Alaska had jurisdiction to prosecute a man accused of committing a sexual 
38. Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77.
39. Id. at 76.
40. 546 P.2d 530, 556 (Alaska 1976).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 554.
43. State v. Jack, 125 P.3d 311, 319 (Alaska 2005).
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assault while on an Alaska state ferry in Canadian waters.44  The court de-
termined that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper even though there was 
no specific state jurisdictional statute authorizing the prosecution.  If no sta-
tute is present, however, the state must have a substantial interest “so that 
the exercise of jurisdiction . . . is reasonable.”45  The court concluded that 
Alaska had a substantial interest in prosecuting the assault to ensure pas-
sengers and cargo transported on state ferries are safe.  The court also be-
lieved the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable given the importance of 
the ferry system to the state and its citizens.  Furthermore, since the federal 
government had not attempted to prosecute the defendant for the crime, 
there was no federal conflict. 
IV. Preemptive Effect of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
Since there are no federal aquaculture rules, there would appear to be
no federal conflict and no preemption of state regulation of aquaculture in 
federal waters.  However, the NOAA Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) has 
taken the position that “aquaculture facilities are subject to the [Magnuson 
Act] because they engage in the ‘harvest’ of fish from the [exclusive econom-
ic zone] (‘EEZ’).”46  The Magnuson Act defines fishing as “the catching, tak-
ing, or harvesting of fish”47 and the OGC interpreted “harvesting” to connote 
the gathering of a crop (i.e., farmed fish).48  
Federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land”49 and thus can preempt 
an otherwise valid exercise of state authority.  Federal preemption of state 
law may be expressed or implied.  The Supreme Court recognizes two types 
of implied preemption:  field preemption, which results when federal regula-
tion is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left 
no room for the States to supplement it” and conflict preemption, which oc-
curs when it is impossible to comply with both the federal and state regula-
tions.50 
With the passage of the MSA, the U.S. claimed “sovereign rights and 
exclusive fishery management authority over all fish” located within the EEZ, 
the area of the ocean extending from 3 – 200 nm offshore.51  The MSA did 
not expressly preempt state regulation of fishing outside of state waters, al-
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id. at 322.
46. Jay S. Johnson and Margaret F. Hayes, NOAA Office of General Counsel,
Memorandum for James W. Brennan, Acting General Counsel, RE: Regulation of Aq-
uaculture in the EEZ 1 (1993) (Johnson Memo). 
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(16)(A).
48. Johnson Memo, supra note 47, at 2.
49. U.S. CONST. ART. VI, cl. 2.
50. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a).
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though it did severely restrict that authority. 
Under the MSA, a state may regulate a fishing vessel outside the 
boundaries of the state if the fishing vessel is registered under the law of the 
state and there is no fishery management plan (“FMP”) or other applicable 
federal fishing regulations or the state laws and regulations are consistent 
with the FMP and federal regulations.52  The term fishing vessel “means any 
vessel, boat, ship, or other craft which is used for, equipped to be used for, 
or of a type which is normally used for fishing; or aiding or assisting one or 
more vessels at sea in the performance of any activity relating to fishing, in-
cluding, but not limited to, preparation, supply, storage, refrigeration, trans-
portation, or processing.”53 
Because states retain limited concurrent authority over fishing activi-
ties in adjacent federal waters, Congress did not manifest through the MSA 
“an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state law.”54  Rather, as 
the Alaska Supreme Court has stated, the MSA “alter[ed] prior law in regards 
to the legitimate exercise of extraterritorial state jurisdiction by replacing 
citizenship and close contact tests with a registration requirement.”55 
In People v. Weeren, the California Supreme Court held that § 1856(a) of 
the MSA permits a state  
[T]o regulate and control the fishing of its citizens in adjacent wa-
ters, when not in conflict with federal law, when there exists a le-
gitimate and demonstrable state interest served by the regula-
tion, and when the fishing is from vessels which are regulated by
it and operated from ports under its authority.56
The defendants, both of whom were citizens and residents of California, had 
been convicted of using spotter aircraft to take broadbill swordfish contrary 
to the California Department of Fish and Game regulations.  Their fishing 
vessel was registered in the state of California.  The court had “no difficulty 
in discerning in the preservation of its valuable fish population the requisite 
state interest for extraterritorial jurisdiction.”57  
Because NOAA views aquaculture as “fishing” for the purposes of the 
MSA, state regulation of aquaculture activities would be subject to the same 
registration limitation as state regulation of traditional fishing activities. 
States could regulate vessels involved in the harvesting of fish from aquacul-
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(3)(A).
53.  Id. § 1802(18).
54. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988).
55. State v. F/V Baranof, 677 Pac. 2d 1245, 1250 (Alaska 1984).
56. People v. Weeren 607 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Cal. 1980).
57. Id. at 1286.  The court upheld California’s regulation of swordfish because
federal swordfish rules had yet to be promulgated and thus there was no conflict be-
tween federal and state law. 
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ture cages if the vessel is registered in the state and there is no FMP or the 
state laws are consistent with the federal rules.  Returning to the HSWRI 
project, California should be able to regulate the activities of vessels en-
gaged in aquaculture of striped bass, because striped bass is not subject to 
a fishery management plan developed by the Pacific Fishery Management 
Council.  
A. Species Subject to FMP
Even when the vessel is registered in the state, state regulation of fish-
ing may be preempted if there is a conflict with federal law.  Upon receiving 
an FMP from a council, NOAA undertakes a review of the FMP to determine 
if it is consistent with the MSA and initiates a public comment period.58  
Once a FMP is approved, NMFS promulgates regulations to implement it. 
Federal regulations, as well as federal statutes, can preempt state law.59  
For example, in 1957, the state of Florida prohibited shrimp trolling in 
the “Tortugas Shrimp Bed.”60  A large portion of this shrimp bed was beyond 
Florida’s territorial waters.  Following the passage of the MSA, the Gulf of 
Mexico Fishery Management Council developed a FMP for the shrimp fishery 
and the Secretary of Commerce issued regulations to implement the Shrimp 
FMP in 1981.  The FMP prohibited shrimp fishing in the “Tortugas Shrimp 
Sanctuary.” Although the boundaries of the Tortugas Shrimp Sanctuary sub-
stantially overlapped with the state-designated Tortugas Shrimp Bed, a por-
tion of the shrimp bed located in federal waters fell outside the federal 
Sanctuary.61  That portion was therefore open to shrimp fishermen under 
federal law, but off-limits to shrimp fishermen who were citizens of Florida.  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that the 
Shrimp FMP preempted the Florida law prohibiting shrimp fishing in a por-
tion of the EEZ.62  The court determined that the state law both conflicted 
with the federal law, because it prohibited fishing in an area where the FMP 
allowed it, and stood as an obstacle to a primary purpose of the Magnuson 
Act – the promotion of domestic commercial fishing.63  The court enjoined 
the state from enforcing the state statute in a manner that conflicts with 
58. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a).
59. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985). 
60. Bateman v. Gardner, 716 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 598.
63. While the promotion of domestic commercial and recreational fishing
remains a key purpose of the MSA, Congress now requires that such promotion occur 
“under sound conservation and management principles” and that fishery manage-
ment plans be developed “which will achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, 
the optimum yield from each fishery” 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(3) and (4). 
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federal regulations.64 
FMPs can also preempt indirect state regulation of a fishery.  In Se. Fi-
sheries Ass’n v. Mosbacher, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
held that the Secretary of Commerce’s failure to supercede state landing and 
possession laws when implementing the Gulf of Mexico Red Drum FMP was 
arbitrary and capricious.65  Fishing for red drum occurs in state and federal 
waters in the Gulf of Mexico.  Concern over the increasing harvest of red 
drum in the EEZ in the mid-1980s led the Gulf Council to develop a Red 
Drum FMP in 1986.  The FMP and a subsequent amendment established a 
100,000-pound quota for the indirect (bycatch) fishery and provided for the 
application of state landing and possession laws to red drum harvested in 
the indirect fishery.66 
Because at least four out of the five Gulf States prohibited or restricted 
the possession, landing, and sale of bycatch, the court concluded that the 
state laws effectively prevented fisherman from landing fish harvested legal-
ly in federal waters.  This prohibition, according to the court, prevented the 
state laws from coexisting with the federal scheme.67  As a result, the Secre-
tary should have expressly preempted those laws in his regulations imple-
menting the Red Drum FMP.  When the Secretary issued the final rule in 
1992 to implement the Red Drum FMP following the Mosbacher decision, the 
“language specifying that, at such time as a catch of red drum is allowed, a 
person landing red drum, other than from a directed commercial fishery, 
must comply with the landing and possession laws of the state where 
landed” was removed.68 
B. Species Not Subject to FMP
States have more flexibility to regulate fishing activities when the spe-
cies in question is not managed under a FMP.  In People v. Weeren, as men-
tioned above, a California law prohibiting the use of aircraft in the taking of 
swordfish was upheld because, at the time of the defendant’s conviction, the 
federal government had not yet promulgated rules for the swordfish fi-
shery.69  As a result, there was no federal law with which the state law might 
conflict.  The court found it significant that “because the federal government 
has developed no swordfish regulations, the exclusion of any such state reg-
ulation would create the danger of wholly unregulated exploitation of that 
species in coastal waters and on the high seas.”70  
64. Bateman v. Gardner, 716 F. Supp. at 598.
65. 773 F. Supp. 435,440 (D.D.C. 1991).
66. Id. at 439.
67. Id. at 441.
68. 57 Fed. Reg. 40134 (Sept. 2, 1992).
69. 607 P.2d 1279,1286 (Cal. 1980).
70. Id.
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In State v. F/V Baranof, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the seizure of 
an Alaska-registered vessel for violating state laws governing the harvest of 
king crab.71  The alleged violations occurred in federal waters.  The court held 
that the MSA did not preempt state action in this situation, because there 
were no federal king crab regulations.72  That court reasoned that “holding 
that the [Magnuson Act] preempted all state regulation in the [EEZ] even in 
the absence of the promulgation of federal regulations would frustrate the 
primary purpose of the [Act], which is to provide proper management to en-
sure that fisheries are not depleted.”73 
C. State Regulation of Aquaculture in the EEZ
In the absence of federal legislation creating a regulatory framework for 
offshore aquaculture, which either preempts state authority or delineates 
the states’ proper roles, state regulation of aquaculture would depend on 
the preemptive effect of the MSA.  HSWRI is considering stocking its cages 
with striped bass.  The Pacific Council has not developed an FMP for striped 
bass and there are no federal regulations for the fishery.  California may, 
therefore, have the authority to regulate state-registered vessels engaged in 
striped bass aquaculture. 
The analysis changes, however, if there is an FMP, such as the aquacul-
ture FMP under development for the Gulf of Mexico.  In January 2009, the 
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council finalized its Fishery Manage-
ment Plan for Regulating Offshore Marine Aquaculture in the Gulf of Mex-
ico.74  The Aquaculture FMP would authorize NOAA Fisheries to issue aqua-
culture permits to deploy and operate aquaculture systems in the Gulf of 
Mexico EEZ, operate hatcheries in the EEZ for spawning and rearing of al-
lowable species, harvest wild broodstock for aquaculture purposes, and pos-
sess, transport, land, and sell allowable aquaculture species.75  Allowable 
species would include all species native to the Gulf of Mexico, such as snap-
per, grouper, and red drum, which are managed by the Gulf Council, exclud-
ing shrimp and corals.76 
Approval of the Aquaculture FMP could preempt any state regulation 
of offshore aquaculture in the Gulf of Mexico, at least with respect to species 
71. 677 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1984).
72. The Pacific Fishery Management Council had prepared an FMP for king
crab and proposed regulations, but the Secretary had not yet promulgated final regu-
lations.  Id. at 1251. 
73. Id.
74. Final Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Fishery Management Plan




76. Id. at 4.
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managed by the Council.  However, the Council does not manage all fish 
species in the Gulf of Mexico.  Councils only prepare fishery management 
plans for fisheries that require conservation and management.77  States 
might be able to regulate the aquaculture of species not managed under a 
FMP.  However, state regulation of aquaculture in the Gulf following the ap-
proval of the FMP could conflict with the federal regulations.  For example, a 
state regulation allowing the culture of a species prohibited by the Gulf 
Council’s FMP would frustrate the purpose of the federal regulations.  
The approval of the Gulf Council’s FMP would not, however, affect 
state authority over aquaculture in other regions.  For example, say some-
one wanted to culture Fish X, a species managed a Gulf Council FMP, in fed-
eral waters off the coast of Washington and the Pacific Council does not cur-
rently manage Fish X.  The Gulf FMP would not preempt Washington’s 
exercise of authority over the aquaculture operations, because there are no 
federal aquaculture rules that apply in that region. 
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1).
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V. Conclusion
Considerable attention has been paid to the federal government’s au-
thority to regulate aquaculture operations located outside of state waters 
(generally, more than three nm from shore).78  Less attention has been paid 
to state government authority.  Contrary to popular belief, states have signif-
icant authority under the CZMA and the Magnuson Act to influence the de-
velopment of the U.S. offshore aquaculture industry.  Proponents of new leg-
islative and regulatory frameworks to govern offshore aquaculture should 
keep this traditional authority in mind and strive to include states in the 
process.  After all, states will both share in the economic benefit of new aq-
uaculture operations and the environmental risk they pose. 
78. The Aquaculture FMP entered into effect on September 3, 2009 by opera-
tion of law when NOAA failed to respond to the Gulf Council's submission within the 
required timeframe.  Press Release, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, NOAA to Pursue National Policy for Sustainable Marine Aquaculture (Sept. 2, 
2009), available at http://aquaculture.noaa.gov/pdf/aqnatlpol09.pdf.  Although the FMP 
has taken effect, aquaculture operations are unlikely to be permitted anytime soon. 
Before permits may be issued, NOAA must promulgate implementing regulations 
and the agency has indicated that it wants to develop a comprehensive national pol-
icy for sustainable marine aquaculture before doing so.  Id.  In addition, Food & Wa-
ter Watch and several other organizations filed a lawsuit on October 2, 2009 chal-
lenging the validity of NOAA's action on the Aquaculture FMP and the agency's 
authority to permit offshore aquaculture.  Press Release, Food & Water Watch, Food 
& Water Watch and Other Organizations Sue Secretary of Commerce and Agencies on 
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